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Abstract
In Motorola Mobility, LLC v. AU Optronics Corporation, the Seventh Circuit dismissed Mo-
torola’s Sherman Act claims under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act. In doing so,
they held that Motorola’s American parent corporation was a separate entity from their foreign
subsidiaries, and thus barred from bringing suit under the indirect purchaser doctrine. The effect
of the Seventh Circuit’s decision precluded injured purchasers from recovering damages under the
Sherman Act—Motorola’s subsidiaries could not sue because their injuries occurred abroad, while
Motorola could not sue because it did not make direct purchases from the antitrust violators.
Courts have often considered a parent and wholly owned subsidiary as a single economic entity for
the purposes of antitrust laws, such as under the indirect purchaser doctrine and intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine. While parents and subsidiaries are two distinct entities in a legal corporate
context, there are certain economic benefits for considering them one unit, such as promoting
economic efficiency, supporting the efficient use of international supply chains, and encouraging
deterrence. Therefore, basic antitrust inquiries, such as the existence of market power and the
possibility of conspiracy, require focusing on the substance, rather than the form, of corporations.
This Note seeks to explore why the Seventh Circuit chose not to treat Motorola’s American parent
company and wholly owned foreign subsidiaries as a single economic unit. It further analyzes the
treatment of the parent-subsidiary relationship under the Sherman Act and Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act. This Note proposes that an exception needs to be made under the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvement Act to grant an indirect American parent corporation standing to sue under
the Sherman Act when the direct purchaser is a wholly owned foreign subsidiary and the effects
of a foreign anticompetitive conduct have a direct impact on United States commerce.
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ABSTRACT 
In Motorola Mobility, LLC v. AU Optronics Corporation, the 
Seventh Circuit dismissed Motorola’s Sherman Act claims under the 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act. In doing so, they held 
that Motorola’s American parent corporation was a separate entity 
from their foreign subsidiaries, and thus barred from bringing suit 
under the indirect purchaser doctrine. The effect of the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision precluded injured purchasers from recovering 
damages under the Sherman Act—Motorola’s subsidiaries could not 
sue because their injuries occurred abroad, while Motorola could not 
sue because it did not make direct purchases from the antitrust 
violators. 
Courts have often considered a parent and wholly owned subsidiary 
as a single economic entity for the purposes of antitrust laws, such as 
under the indirect purchaser doctrine and intra-enterprise conspiracy 
doctrine. While parents and subsidiaries are two distinct entities in a 
legal corporate context, there are certain economic benefits for 
considering them one unit, such as promoting economic efficiency, 
supporting the efficient use of international supply chains, and 
encouraging deterrence. Therefore, basic antitrust inquiries, such as 
the existence of market power and the possibility of conspiracy, 
require focusing on the substance, rather than the form, of 
corporations. 
This Note seeks to explore why the Seventh Circuit chose not to treat 
Motorola’s American parent company and wholly owned foreign 
subsidiaries as a single economic unit. It further analyzes the 
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treatment of the parent-subsidiary relationship under the Sherman 
Act and Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act. This Note 
proposes that an exception needs to be made under the Foreign 
Trade Antitrust Improvement Act to grant an indirect American 
parent corporation standing to sue under the Sherman Act when the 
direct purchaser is a wholly owned foreign subsidiary and the effects 
of a foreign anticompetitive conduct have a direct impact on United 
States commerce. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Beginning as early as 1998, and continuing through 2006, 
conspirators secretly agreed to fix liquid crystal display (“LCD”) panel 
prices.1  LCD panels, unlike other cellular telephone inputs, have no 
utility apart from their component value.2 The result of this price-fixing 
was a highly effective cartel that consistently inflated LCD prices.3 The 
conspirators accomplished this price-fixing scheme through targeted 
sales of those inflated LCD panels to Motorola Mobility, LLC 
(“Motorola”), an American mobile cell phone company that held a top 
share of the United States market and sold more phones in the United 
States than anywhere else.4 Like many American companies, Motorola 
developed manufacturing operations in Asia to take advantage of lower 
production costs.5 However, all aspects of Motorola’s business began 
and ended in the United States: they designed the phones, selected the 
parts, determined the prices, and dictated the terms on which finished 
products were imported and sold to Motorola’s customers in the United 
States.6 
On the other hand, the conspirators did not sell the LCD panels 
directly into the United States. First, the conspirators sold the inflated 
LCD panels to Motorola’s wholly owned foreign subsidiaries in China 
and Singapore, where the panels were incorporated into the mobile cell 
phones.7 The subsidiaries then imported their LCD products into the 
United States for sale at a higher cost. 8  Through this avenue, the 
conspirators’ anticompetitive conduct reached United States commerce.9 
This price-fixing conspiracy affected well over $23.5 billion worth of 
LCD panels imported into the United States, and enabled the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 13, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics 
Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-8003), 2014 U.S. 7th Cir. 
Briefs LEXIS 277 [hereinafter Appellant’s Opening Brief]. LCD panels, important 
components in mobile phones, use a liquid crystal film to display information on a thin 
surface. Id. 
 2. Id. at 12. 
 3. Id. at 13. 
 4. Id. at 5. 
 5. Id. at 7. 
 6. Id. at 16-17. 
 7. Id. at 21. 
 8. Id. at 26. 
 9. Id. at 14. 
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conspirators to impose overcharges of more than $2 billion on those 
imports.10 But because these antitrust activities took place abroad, all 
parties seeking to bring suit had to first bring their case within the 
confines of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (“FTAIA”).11 
The indirect purchasers in the United States, in this case Motorola’s 
parent company, if not confronted with the indirect purchaser doctrine, 
might have standing if the company was able to show that “a direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on United States 
commerce gave rise to their claim.12 
The above facts explain the background of a recent Seventh Circuit 
case: Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics Corporation.13 The Seventh 
Circuit’s treatment of the parent-subsidiary relationship in Motorola 
Mobility, as compared to other antitrust doctrines, is the focus of this 
Note. While several antitrust doctrines, such as the intra-enterprise 
conspiracy doctrine and indirect purchaser doctrine, treat a parent and its 
wholly owned subsidiary as one entity, the Seventh Circuit declined to 
follow a similar approach in Motorola Mobility.14 In fact, the Seventh 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Brief for the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 3, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015) 
(No. 14-1122), 2015 WL 1798940, at *2-3 [hereinafter Brief for AAI]. 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012). The FTAIA creates a general rule that antitrust laws 
under the Sherman Act shall not “apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other 
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations.” Id. To establish an 
exception, the American parent company would have to show that the conspirators’ 
actions had “a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on United States 
commerce, and that such an effect “gives rise to a claim.” Id.; see infra Part I.B. 
 12. See infra Part III.A. 
 13. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d 
816 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 14. The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine stated that a conspiracy in violation of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act exists where one individual owned or controlled 
separately incorporated conspiring companies. See generally United States v. Yellow 
Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube 
Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). The doctrine was overturned in Copperweld Corp., where 
the Supreme Court held that a parent corporation is incapable of conspiring with its 
wholly owned subsidiary. See Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 779. The indirect 
purchaser doctrine limits recovery of damages in antitrust violations only to those 
entities that dealt directly with the cartel, or when the direct purchaser is owned or 
controlled by another entity, such as a subsidiary. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 
720, 736 n.16 (1977). In contrast, the Seventh Circuit held in Motorola Mobility that the 
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Circuit refused to collapse Motorola’s parent corporation and their 
foreign subsidiaries into one economic unit, arguing “corporate 
formalities should be respected unless one of the recognized 
justifications for piercing the veil, or otherwise deeming a parent and a 
subsidiary one, is present.”15 The inconsistent treatment of the parent-
subsidiary relationship under the FTAIA and other antitrust doctrines 
under the Sherman Act is perplexing; there is no legitimate rationale for 
the difference.16 
In Motorola Mobility, the Seventh Circuit decided to treat 
Motorola’s parent and subsidiary companies as separate economic units, 
and dismissed Motorola’s Sherman Act claims.17 The court gave three 
rationales for its decision. First, the court determined that Motorola’s 
antitrust claim failed because Motorola could not satisfy the “gives rise 
to” prong of the FTAIA. 18  Because Motorola’s American parent 
company was injured abroad when it purchased the price-fixed 
component, the effect in the United States of the price-fixing was not 
enough to give rise to an antitrust claim.19 Second, the court held that 
Motorola could not satisfy the Illinois Brick doctrine.20 The price-fixed 
LCD panels were bought directly by Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries, 
and then sold to Motorola, making Motorola an indirect purchaser.21 
Thus, Motorola was barred from bringing suit under Illinois Brick.22 
Lastly, the court observed that Motorola could not satisfy the choice-of-
law rules. 23  Foreign-injured corporations ordinarily must sue in the 
                                                                                                                 
American parent company could not sue for damages because the direct purchaser was 
a wholly owned foreign subsidiary. See generally Motorola II, 775 F.3d 816. 
 15. Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 820. 
 16. See generally Robert E. Connolly, Repeal the FTAIA! (or at Least Consider It 
as Coextensive with Hartford Fire), CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Sept. 2014. 
 17. See Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 820. 
 18. See Randy M. Stutz, The FTAIA in Flux: Foreign Component-Goods Cases 
Have Tripped, But Have They Fallen?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Jan. 2015, at 4. 
 19. See Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 823. The court’s reasoning reads as follows: 
“Remember that the [FTAIA] requires that the effect of an anticompetitive practice on 
domestic U.S. commerce must, to be subject to the Sherman Act, give rise to an 
antitrust cause of action. [Motorola] . . . would have been injured abroad when [it] 
purchased the price-fixed components.” Id. 
 20. Stutz, supra note 18, at 4. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730 (1977) (barring indirect purchasers 
from bringing suit under section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
 23. Stutz, supra note 18, at 4. 
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country in which it is incorporated and operates, or the country where 
they took delivery of the cartelized goods.24 Therefore, Motorola had 
standing to sue abroad, where the injury occurred, rather than in the 
United States.25 Furthermore, the court noted the prevalence of global 
supply chains in the current economy and predicted that to extend 
application of the Sherman Act to the activities of the defendants in this 
case would result in an “enormous[] increase [in] the global reach of the 
Sherman Act, creating friction with many foreign countries.”26 
As the Seventh Circuit noted, international global supply chains are 
prolific in modern business. The many businesses that hope to remain 
competitive in the globalized economy have started to expand their 
operations abroad.27 After all, “[n]othing is more common nowadays 
than for products imported to the United States to include components 
that the producers bought from foreign manufacturers.”28 A common 
organizational strategy involves a domestic parent company establishing 
a foreign subsidiary that acts as a link in the parent’s global supply 
chain, such as the one that existed in Motorola Mobility. 29  These 
corporate structures provide the American parent company with many 
competitive advantages: increased sourcing, efficient manufacturing, 
cheaper transportation, and wider distribution. 30  However, the 
advantages end when the foreign subsidiary falls prey to anticompetitive 
conduct abroad. 
Consider the following three scenarios: (1) an American company 
has a warehouse in China; it buys components in China and stores them 
briefly in the warehouse there before sending them on to the United 
States; (2) an American company owns a manufacturing plant in China; 
it buys components in China, manufacturers the products in China and 
then ships the finalized products into the United States to be assembled 
into the finished product; and (3) an American company in either 
scenario (1) or (2) does the same thing through a Chinese subsidiary. In 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d 
816, 818 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 26. Id. at 824. 
 27. See id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 817. 
 30. See Jeffrey H. Smith, Note, Call Me, Maybe? The Seventh Circuit’s Call in 
Motorola Mobility, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2063, 2063 (2015). 
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all three of these scenarios, the substance of the transactions is the same 
(the American company is importing products manufactured abroad), 
but the form is different (the relationship between the American 
company and manufacturing plant). This Note argues that regardless of 
the form, all three scenarios should all be treated similarly. 
This Note will explore why the Seventh Circuit chose not to treat 
Motorola’s American parent company and wholly owned foreign 
subsidiary as a single economic unit. Part I of this Note outlines the 
history of the Sherman Act, focusing primarily on the rationale behind 
the creation of the FTAIA. Part II analyzes the treatment of the parent-
subsidiary relationship in other antitrust contexts; specifically, the 
indirect purchaser doctrine and the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. 
Part III proposes that an exception needs to be made under the FTAIA to 
provide an indirect American parent corporation standing to sue under 
the Sherman Act when the direct purchaser is a wholly owned foreign 
subsidiary and the effects of foreign anticompetitive conduct have a 
direct impact on United States commerce. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY: THE PURPOSE OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 
AND RATIONALE FOR THE CREATION OF THE FTAIA 
A. THE SHERMAN ACT AND ITS FUNCTION 
United States antitrust law “covers foreign conduct producing a 
substantial intended effect in the United States.”31 The purpose of the 
Sherman Act is to promote competition and to prohibit the 
monopolization and restraint of trade. 32  One of the Sherman Act’s 
express goals, according to Senator Sherman, is “to combat the trusts 
and cartels which . . . ‘were imported from abroad.’”33 As a result, the 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797 & n.24 (1993). 
 32. Section 1 of the Sherman Act is directed toward anticompetitive contracts, 
combinations, and conspiracies, and as such, requires more than one actor. Section 2 is 
designed to prevent monopolization and can therefore apply to unilateral conduct. See 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2012). 
 33. Hearings on H.R. 2326 before the Subcomm. on Monopolies & Commercial 
Law of the H. Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong. 42 (1981) (statement of Prof. James A. 
Rahl). 
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Sherman Act is applied to foreign conduct by international conspiracies 
to the extent they cause anticompetitive effects in the United States.34 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act applies to “every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations.” 35  Similarly, section 2 of the Sherman Act applies to the 
monopolization of “any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
states, or with foreign nations.”36 The pre-FTAIA Sherman Act is silent 
on its application to conduct occurring outside the United States.37 
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., the Supreme Court 
first considered the international reach of the Sherman Act.38 There, the 
Court held that the Sherman Act did not govern anticompetitive acts that 
took place in Panama and Costa Rica.39 The Court articulated an “almost 
universal rule . . . that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must 
be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”40 
Over time, the strict territorial interpretation of the Sherman Act 
softened and courts began to exercise jurisdiction over certain 
extraterritorial actions that affected competition in the United States.41 
Then, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (“Alcoa”), Judge 
Learned Hand developed an effects test for determining when 
extraterritorial activity could be subject to liability under the Sherman 
Act.42 Under this test, the extraterritorial activities at issue must have 
been intended to affect imports and must have actually affected them in 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 600 
(1951), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 
(1984); United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 348 (1947), abrogated by Cont’l 
T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 
221 U.S. 106, 172, 182 (1911). 
 35. Sherman Act of 1890 § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 36. Sherman Act of 1890 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
 37. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1974). 
 38. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. at 356. 
 41. Joseph P. Bauer, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Do We Really 
Want to Return to American Banana?, 65 ME. L. REV. 3, 7-8 (2012). 
 42. See generally United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 
(2d Cir. 1945), superseded by statute, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 
1982 § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012). 
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order to fall within the reach of the Sherman Act. 43  Judge Hand 
distinguished American Banana and asserted that it was “settled law” 
that “any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its 
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within 
its borders which the state reprehends.”44 Under this test, “the Sherman 
Act applie[d] to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in 
fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.”45 
B. ANTITRUST STANDING UNDER THE FTAIA 
Following Alcoa, the effects test was applied in a variety of forms, 
as numerous courts struggled to create a framework for analyzing the 
international reach of the antitrust laws. 46  Seeking to resolve the 
conflicts regarding the application of the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial 
reach, Congress passed the FTAIA in 1982.47 The FTAIA was part of 
the congressional attempt to state clear rules for identifying the 
applicability of the antitrust laws to certain foreign activities.48 
Congress had two primary concerns in passing the statute: (1) that 
United States courts would be overwhelmed with lawsuits regarding 
actions that had minimal effects on domestic commerce and primarily 
served foreign interests; and (2) that the inconsistent application of the 
Sherman Act was having a detrimental effect on international 
commerce.49 Congress further stated that the purpose of the FTAIA was 
to address the “apparent perception among businessmen that American 
antitrust laws are a barrier to joint export activities that promote 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. at 444. 
 44. Id. at 443. 
 45. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993). 
 46. Compare Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 610-13 (9th 
Cir. 1976) (applying a test that balances considerations of international comity with 
domestic effects, yet noting that “[e]ven among American courts and commentators, 
however, there is no consensus on how far the jurisdiction should extend.”), superseded 
by statute, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 6a, as 
recognized in McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), 
with Nat’l Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying 
an effects test similar to that used in Alcoa). 
 47. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 
Stat. 1246. 
 48. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 307(a), 96 Stat. 
1233, 1237. 
 49. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2-3 (1982). 
648 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
efficiencies in the export of American goods and services.”50 For these 
reasons, the FTAIA was enacted to protect American companies from 
the application of the antitrust laws when their allegedly anticompetitive 
activities affected only foreign markets while also preserving the 
Sherman Act claims of American companies and consumers with 
respect to conduct that caused domestic harms.51 
The FTAIA is consistent with the longstanding view of how the 
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct, the anticompetitive effects of 
which at home and abroad are “inextricably bound up.”52 In such cases, 
even wholly foreign plaintiffs can invoke the protections of the Sherman 
Act. 53  Furthermore, the FTAIA clarifies that conduct affecting only 
foreign commerce is outside the scope of the Sherman Act regardless of 
whether the defendant is an American company or not, thus “assur[ing] 
foreign countries and their citizens that they would not be swept into a 
U.S. court to answer under U.S. law for actions that were of no 
legitimate concern to the United States.”54 However, this would imply 
that if a foreign antitrust violation creates domestic harm, this conduct 
could be brought under the FTAIA.55 
Despite the passage of the FTAIA, controversy about the 
appropriate scope of the antitrust laws has not ended. Lower courts have 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. 
 51. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner Motorola Mobility, LLC at 11, Motorola 
Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d 816, 818 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(No. 14-8003), 2014 WL 3586199, at *11 [hereinafter Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief] 
(citing Export Trading Company Act of 1982 § 102(b), 15 U.S.C. § 4001); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 7-8 (stating that the FTAIA was passed to allow U.S. 
businesses to freely compete in overseas markets, so as to increase United States 
exports of products and services.) This is confirmed by Supreme Court case law. See, 
e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) 
(“[A]pplication of our antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct [under the 
FTAIA] is . . . reasonable, and hence consistent with principles of prescriptive comity, 
insofar as they reflect a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign 
anticompetitive conduct has caused.”). 
 52. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 171-72 (citation and emphasis omitted). 
 53. Id. 
 54. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 962 (7th Cir. 
2003) (en banc) (Wood, J., dissenting), overruled by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 
683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 55. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a. 
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accurately described the FTAIA as “convoluted,”56 and an “inelegantly 
phrased”57 “web of words.”58 The statute provides as follows: 
[The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or 
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with 
foreign nations unless— 
(1) such conduct has direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable 
effect— 
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with 
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with 
foreign nations; or 
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of 
a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United 
States; and 
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of [the 
Sherman Act], other than this section.59 
The FTAIA begins by placing all extraterritorial activity other than 
import trade and import commerce outside the reach of the Sherman 
Act.60 It then pulls some activity back within the Sherman Act’s reach 
when two requirements are met.61 First, the conduct must have a “direct, 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300 (3d Cir. 2002), 
overruled by Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 57. Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Oriental Rug Imps. Ass’n, 227 F.3d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(quoting United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997)), 
overruled by Animal Sci. Prods., 654 F.3d 462. 
 58. United States v. Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d 1074, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014), amended by 
778 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 6a. 
 60. This is known as the “import trade or commerce” exception. The Sherman Act 
will apply where the defendants are involved in import trade or import commerce. See 
15 U.S.C. § 6a. Several courts applying the FTAIA have held that what is relevant 
under the import provisions is “whether the alleged conduct by the defendants 
‘involved’ import trade or commerce, not . . . whether the plaintiff’s conduct, which is 
not being challenged as violative of the Sherman Act, ‘involved’ import trade or 
commerce.” Carpet Grp., 227 F.3d at 71; see also Turicentro, 303 F.3d 293; Kruman v. 
Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002), abrogated by F. Hoffman-La Roche 
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
 61. 15 U.S.C.§ 6a(2). 
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substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic commerce.62 
Second, the effect must “give[] rise to” a Sherman Act claim.63 Congress 
did not intend the FTAIA to depart from the long-settled rule that “the 
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and 
did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.”64 
II. ONE OR NONE: HOW TO TREAT THE PARENT-SUBSIDIARY ISSUE 
Courts have often considered a parent and wholly owned subsidiary 
as a single economic unit for the purposes of antitrust law.65 While 
parents and subsidiaries are two distinct entities in a corporate context, 
there are certain economic benefits for considering them one unit under 
antitrust law. 66  Consider the three scenarios mentioned in the 
introduction: while the form of the three corporations were all different 
and distinct, the substance was the same—the components were bought 
and manufactured abroad and then shipped into the United States.67 To 
promote economic efficiency, a corporation will choose the least costly 
form. 68  Therefore, while there are corporate law implications for 
creating subsidiaries, reliance on this separation is not needed in an 
antitrust context given that economic efficiencies must be taken into 
account.69 
The legal form of a corporation defines “the scope of its liabilities 
but does not circumscribe economic units in the marketplace.” 70 
However, the “discrepancy between the scope of legal entities (form) 
and economic units (substance)” has caused confusion among many 
courts.71 Courts do not “fully recognize that corporations use the legal 
form for many purposes that do not define their economic substance.”72 
                                                                                                                 
 62. This is known as the “direct effect” prong. Id. § 6a(1). 
 63. This is known as the “gives rise to” prong. Id. § 6a(2). 
 64. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795-96 (1993). 
 65. See infra Part II.C. 
 66. See infra Part II.C. 
 67. See supra Introduction. 
 68. See Smith, supra note 30, at 2063-64, 2064 n.8. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Barak Orbach, The Durability of Formalism in Antitrust, 100 IOWA L. REV. 
2197, 2206 (2015). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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For example, when corporations are affiliated, such as wholly owned 
subsidiaries, a court’s “reliance on the legal form may distort antitrust 
analysis.”73 Additionally, basic antitrust inquiries, such as the existence 
of market power, require clear definitions of market participants that 
focus on the substance, rather than the form, of corporations. 74 
Therefore, these legal and economic implications must be factored into a 
court’s analysis for the purposes of antitrust violations.75 
A. THE PARENT-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT 
Courts have often considered a parent and wholly owned subsidiary 
as a single economic entity for the purposes of antitrust laws, such as 
under the indirect purchaser doctrine and intra-enterprise conspiracy 
doctrine.76 While parents and subsidiaries are two distinct entities in a 
legal corporate context, there are certain economic benefits for 
considering them one unit, such as promoting economic efficiency, 
supporting the efficient use of international supply chains, and 
encouraging deterrence.77 However, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Motorola Mobility is inconsistent with these antitrust doctrines, holding 
that Motorola’s parent company and wholly owned subsidiaries were 
two separate entities, and thus barred from bringing a claim under the 
FTAIA.78 
1. Indirect Purchaser Doctrine 
The indirect purchaser doctrine prohibits indirect purchasers of 
goods or services from recovering antitrust damages from violators.79 
The doctrine evolved from section 4 of the Clayton Act.80 It was created 
through two separate Supreme Court decisions that considered antitrust 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See infra Part II.C.1-2. 
 77. Orbach, supra note 70, at 2206. 
 78. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d 
816, 820 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 79. See generally Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
 80. Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits “[a]ny person . . . injured in his business 
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antirust laws” to bring suit for treble 
damages. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012). 
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problems associated with multiparty supply chains. The first case 
provides that a direct purchaser can recover the full amount of an illegal 
overcharge, regardless of whether that cost is passed on to downstream 
buyers. 81  The second provides that downstream buyers do not have 
standing regardless of how much of the overcharge is passed on to 
them.82 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe 
Machinery Corp.83 and Illinois Brick Corp. v. Illinois84 limited recovery 
of damages in cases of supra-competitive overcharges to only those 
entities that dealt directly with the cartel responsible for the overcharge, 
or the “direct purchaser.” 85  The result left subsequent, or “indirect 
purchasers,” who often suffer substantial harm, without a remedy or 
standing to sue. 86  The rule serves to avoid the difficulties of 
“apportion[ing] recovery among all potential plaintiffs . . . from direct 
purchasers to middlemen to ultimate consumers.”87 It further seeks to 
eliminate the possibility of duplicative recovery and promotes 
enforcement by purchasers who have been most directly injured by the 
alleged violation.88 
To understand the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Brick, it is 
important to first consider the decision in Hanover Shoe. There, a shoe 
manufacturer sued a manufacturer of shoe machinery who had 
monopolized the shoe machinery industry in violation of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.89 The defendant argued that it should be allowed to show 
that the plaintiff had not been injured by the antitrust violation because 
the plaintiff had passed on the costs of the violation to its consumers, the 
purchasers of the shoes, and thus was not harmed.90 The Court had to 
address whether an alleged illegal monopolist could use this “passing-
                                                                                                                 
 81. See generally Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 
(1968). 
 82. See generally Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. 720. 
 83. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. 481. 
 84. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. 720. 
 85. See generally id. 
 86. See id. at 738-42. 
 87. See id. at 728-33. 
 88. See id. at 731 n.11. 
 89. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
 90. See id. at 491-92. 
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on” defense.91 The Court rejected this argument, holding that there is no 
“passing-on” defense to a suit by a direct purchaser.92 If the defense 
were effective, antitrust violators “would retain the fruits of their 
illegality.”93 Instead, the Court decided to grant the direct purchaser the 
entire award, acknowledging that this would be a windfall. 94  The 
rationale for this windfall was that concentrating the full recovery for 
the overcharge in the direct purchasers would more effectively enforce 
the antitrust laws, rather than allowing every potential plaintiff to sue 
only for the amount it could show that it individually absorbed.95 
In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court dealt with the flip side of the 
“passing-on” defense: offensive “passing-on.” 96  There, the plaintiffs, 
represented by the State of Illinois suing on behalf of itself and local 
governmental entities, claimed overcharges in connection with various 
construction projects.97 The defendants, manufacturers and distributors 
of concrete block alleged to be in collusion, sold the block to masonry 
contractors who submitted bids to general contractors.98  The general 
contractors in turn submitted bids to customers such as the plaintiffs.99 
Rather than facing an antitrust violator seeking to reduce its liability by 
asserting a “passing-on” defense, the Court addressed whether an 
indirect purchaser could recover damages by proving overcharges had 
been passed on.100 The Court considered two ways to avoid multiple 
liabilities: (1) allow indirect purchasers to sue by overruling Hanover 
Shoe; or (2) retain Hanover Shoe and preclude indirect purchasers from 
suing.101 The Court chose the latter.102 
Like Hanover Shoe, the Illinois Brick opinion was grounded on 
policy considerations.103 The overriding consideration was symmetry.104 
                                                                                                                 
 91. The “passing-on” defense is a claim that the direct purchaser was not injured 
because it raised its prices in response to the monopolist’s price increase, absorbing 
none of the increased costs itself. See id. at 491-94. 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. at 494. 
 94. See id. (providing the full damage award to the direct purchaser). 
 95. See id. 
 96. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 753 (1977). 
 97. Id. at 726-27. 
 98. Id. at 726. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 727-28. 
 101. Id. at 736. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at 736-39. 
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If a defendant manufacturer or supplier was not permitted to employ a 
“passing-on” defense, as was held in Hanover Shoe, an indirect 
purchaser plaintiff would not be permitted to recover passed-on 
damages from that constrained manufacturer or supplier.105 As the Court 
noted in Hanover Shoe, if they had permitted the “passing-on” defense 
to be utilized by defendants, to ensure a return to optimal levels of 
deterrence, plaintiffs other than the direct purchaser would need to be 
allowed to sue the monopolist for damages. 106  And the Court was 
unwilling to “open the door to duplicative recoveries” due to the 
uncertainties and difficulties in analyzing price and output decisions, as 
well as the cost to the judicial system.107 The Court reasoned that the 
“antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating the 
full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers”108  because 
wrongdoers would be less likely to retain the fruits of their illegality for 
want of an economically motivated challenger to bring suit.109 
 a. Exceptions to the Indirect Purchaser Doctrine 
While the direct purchaser standing requirement of Illinois Brick 
has faced criticism from scholars, as well as states, the standing 
requirement continues to apply to federal antitrust claims.110 However, 
the indirect purchaser doctrine is not absolute. There have been many 
exceptions that have evolved over the past several decades, such as the 
“own or control” exception and the “co-conspirator” exception. 111 When 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See id. at 736-740, 737 n.18. 
 105. See id. at 736-47. 
 106. Id. at 745-47. 
 107. Id. at 730-31 (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251 
(1972)). 
 108. Id. at 734-35. 
 109. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968). 
 110. See generally Christopher T. Casamassima & Tammy A. Tsoumas, The Illinois 
Brick Wall: Standing Tall, COMPETITION, Spring 2011, at 67. 
 111. Another famous exception to the Illinois Brick doctrine is the cost-plus 
exception. This exception is not relevant to this Note, so it is not discussed in more 
detail. The cost-plus exception states that the Illinois Brick rule does not apply where an 
indirect purchaser buys a predetermined quantity of price-fixed goods from a direct 
purchaser operating under a “cost-plus” contract as the “pre-existing cost-plus contract 
makes easy the normally complicated task of demonstrating that the overcharge has not 
been absorbed by the direct purchaser.” Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 732 n.12. The direct 
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applying an exception to Illinois Brick, courts often discuss policy 
reasons such as prohibiting duplicative liability, encouraging efficient 
enforcement of the antitrust laws, and avoiding overly complex 
proceedings.112 The “own or control” and “co-conspirator” exceptions 
share a common logic: where the relationship between the parties in a 
multi-tiered distribution chain is such that plaintiffs are the first injured 
parties of alleged anticompetitive agreements, the rationale for the 
Illinois Brick bar disappears.113 Therefore, when one of these exceptions 
applies, indirect purchasers may be permitted to sue.114 
Under the “own or control” and “co-conspirator” exceptions, courts 
have often considered a parent corporation and its subsidiaries as a 
single entity.115 The Supreme Court expressly recognized an “own or 
control” exception to Illinois Brick, and courts have “expanded [the 
exception] to include instances where the defendant owns or controls the 
intermediary that sold the goods to the indirect-purchaser plaintiff.”116 
When the indirect purchaser and direct purchaser act as a single entity, 
courts grant indirect purchasers standing to sue for antitrust damages 
because it preserves “an undiluted incentive in the hands of the most 
likely enforcer” of the antitrust laws.117  Additionally, under the “co-
conspirator” exception, courts have held that “Illinois Brick does not 
limit suits [where] . . . [t]he consumer plaintiff is a direct purchaser from 
the dealer who . . . has conspired illegally with the manufacturer with 
                                                                                                                 
purchaser, in setting the price at which to sell to the indirect purchaser, automatically 
adds a contractually predetermined sum to the price he paid the initial seller. Id. 
 112. See, e.g., Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 
1984); In re Mercedes-Benz Anti-Trust Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 355, 366-67 (D.N.J. 
2001); In re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1295-96 (D. Md. 
1981). 
 113. See Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir. 
1980) (“[The indirect purchaser] cannot sue . . . only for the portion of the overcharge 
that was passed on to it. . . . The only alternatives are to allow [it] to sue . . . for the 
entire amount of the overcharge . . . or not to allow [it] to sue. . . . [The latter] would be 
intolerable.”). 
 114. See Ill. Brick, 341 U.S. at 735. 
 115. See, e.g., Royal Printing Co., 621 F.2d 323; Animal Sci. Prods. Co. v. Hebei 
Welcome Pharm. Co. (In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig.), 279 F.R.D. 90 (E.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
 116. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 279 F.R.D. at 101 (citing In re Industrial 
Diamonds Antitrust Litig., 119 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). 
 117. Matthew M. Duffy, Note, Chipping Away at the Illinois Brick Wall: Expanding 
Exceptions to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1709, 1733 (2012). 
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respect to the very price paid by the consumer.” 118  Both of these 
exceptions help avoid one of the primary concerns of Illinois Brick: 
liability to multiple defendants for treble damages.119 
Under the “co-conspirator” exception, a co-conspirator does not 
need to be named if the co-conspirator is a subsidiary of another 
defendant. 120  In Royal Printing Company v. Kimberly-Clark 
Corporation, the Ninth Circuit held that Illinois Brick does not bar an 
indirect purchaser’s suit where the direct purchaser is a division or 
subsidiary of a co-conspirator.121 There, a printing company and other 
small businesses brought suit against ten manufacturers of paper 
products.122 The plaintiffs had never bought paper products directly from 
any of the defendants, but instead purchased through various 
wholesalers.123 The Ninth Circuit permitted the suit to proceed on the 
basis that plaintiffs could demonstrate that the wholesaler was a 
subsidiary of one of the defendants.124 For those wholesalers that were 
not wholly owned or controlled by the defendants, plaintiffs had no 
standing to sue because they were indirect purchasers.125 Thus, the “co-
conspirator” exception applies when “there is no realistic possibility that 
the direct purchaser will sue its supplier over the antitrust violation.”126 
Under the “own or control” exception, it is well established that the 
indirect purchaser doctrine does not apply where the supposed 
intermediary is controlled by one of the disputed parties. 127  In fact, 
courts applying Illinois Brick have held that where an agent does not 
function as an independent economic entity in the chain of distribution, 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Brennan v. Concord EFS, Inc. (In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig.), 686 F.3d 741, 
750 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 346h (3d 
ed. 2007)). 
 119. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1982). 
 120. See, e.g., Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 931 (3d Cir. 
1986). 
 121. Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 122. Id. at 324. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 326. 
 125. Id. at 327-28. 
 126. Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 127. In re Mercedes-Benz Anti-Trust Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 355, 366 (D.N.J. 2001) 
(citing Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 n.16 (1977)). 
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the purchaser is a direct purchaser from the seller.128 In In re Sugar 
Industry Antitrust Litigation, a candy wholesaler purchased candy from 
a manufacturer who was involved in a price-fixing scheme in the sugar 
industry.129 While the price-fixed commodity, sugar, had been combined 
with other ingredients to form a different product, candy, the price-
fixing enhanced the profits of the candy manufacturers.130 Because the 
alleged price-fixer owned the direct purchaser, the court held that the 
claims were properly asserted. 131  Therefore, without the “own or 
control” exception, antitrust violators could avoid liability by creating a 
subsidiary or otherwise controlled “middlemen” to take the fall, thereby 
preventing indirect purchasers from bringing suit.132 
The Supreme Court first recognized this exception in footnote 
sixteen of Illinois Brick, which stated that the original “own or control” 
exception to the indirect purchaser doctrine applies when the direct and 
indirect purchasers function as one entity.133 When applying the “own or 
control” exception, “the unanimous view is that the exception applies 
not only where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its 
customer, but also where it is owned or controlled by its supplier.”134 
Thus, where an indirect purchaser and direct purchaser act as a single 
entity, courts grant indirect purchasers standing because it preserves “an 
undiluted incentive in the hands of the most likely enforcer” of the 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 505 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Diskin v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., No. 92 Civ. 6347, 1994 
WL 330229, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1994)) (questioning “whether use of the agent 
constitutes a separate step in the vertical distribution of the . . . product.”). 
 129. Stotter & Co. v. Amstar Corp. (In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig.), 579 F.2d 
13, 15 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 130. Id. at 17-18. 
 131. Id. at 19. 
 132. See id. 
 133. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 n.16 (1977) (“Another situation in 
which market forces have been superseded and the pass-on defense might be permitted 
is where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer.”); see also In re 
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petrol. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 497 F. Supp. 218, 
226 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (first citing In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d at 19; 
then citing Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
 134. In re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 (D. Md. 1981); 
see also In re Mercedes-Benz Anti-Trust Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 355, 366 (D.N.J. 2001) 
(“It is also well-established that the rationale of Illinois Brick’s bar to indirect purchaser 
suits does not apply where the supposed intermediary is controlled by one or the other 
of the parties.”). 
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antitrust laws. 135  If an employee directly purchases an overcharged 
product and is subsequently reimbursed by her employer (the indirect 
purchaser), the direct purchaser “retain[s] no independent harm.”136 This 
exception is different from the “co-conspirator” exception, 137  but 
similarly permits indirect purchasers to sue when there “is no realistic 
possibility that the direct purchaser will sue its supplier over the antitrust 
violation.”138 
The subsequent interpretations of footnote sixteen seemingly fit the 
description of Motorola in Motorola Mobility.139 The footnote sixteen 
exception applies where the consumer owns or controls the intermediary 
and where the seller owns or controls the more direct purchaser.140 The 
comparison can be further strengthened because while most courts often 
contemplate the application of the “own or control” exception in the 
context of wholly owned subsidiaries, some see no reason why it could 
not exist through a contractual agency relationship. 141  However, in 
Motorola Mobility, Motorola owned the intermediary foreign subsidiary, 
thus meeting this requirement. 
Often, the “own or control” exception is applied when the direct 
purchaser is owned or controlled by the violator.142 Every rationale for 
Illinois Brick vanishes in this situation because apportionment is 
irrelevant when direct purchasers are unwilling to sue, and deterrence 
will be underserved unless the only likely plaintiffs, indirect purchasers, 
are allowed to sue.143 Contrarily, other courts, such as the one in Jewish 
Hospital Association of Louisville, Kentucky, Inc. v. Stewart Mechanical 
Enterprises, Inc., expanded the exception beyond the parent-subsidiary 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Duffy, supra note 117, at 1733. 
 136. Id. at 1733-34. 
 137. Under the “co-conspirator” exception, courts have held that when there are 
allegations of a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy, a plaintiff’s claim is not barred by 
Illinois Brick. See Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
 138. Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 139. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 n.16 (1977). 
 140. See In re Mercedes-Benz Anti-Trust Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 355, 366 (D.N.J. 
2001) (citing Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 736 n.16). 
 141. Id. 
 142. See, e.g., Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 326 (9th 
Cir. 1980). 
 143. See Duffy, supra note 117, at 1743. 
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relationship to cases where there is a “functional economic or other 
unity between the direct purchaser and either the defendant or the 
indirect purchaser [such] that there effectively has been only one 
sale.”144 While most cases involve a unity between the direct purchaser 
and defendant, there is no reason that this exception should not similarly 
apply to the plaintiff.145 Furthermore, footnote sixteen of Illinois Brick 
hints that the exception can apply to a plaintiff.146 
2. Intra-enterprise Conspiracy Doctrine 
The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine rested on the premise that 
certain multidivisional business enterprises contain enough actors 
necessary to meet section 1 of the Sherman Act’s conspiracy 
requirement.147 It provided that a parent company and its wholly owned 
subsidiary could satisfy the requirements of a conspiracy that could 
unlawfully restrain trade under the Sherman Act.148 Internal decisions 
made among these subsidiaries or with the parent company were, 
therefore, subject to section 1 liability as an illegal conspiracy if they 
restrained trade from outsiders.149 
The parent-subsidiary relationship had been treated as a single 
entity within the economic doctrine of the intra-enterprise conspiracy. In 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,150 the Supreme Court 
reversed the Seventh Circuit’s finding that a parent and wholly owned 
subsidiary, who conspired to restrain trade in the structural steel tubing 
market by warning several prospective suppliers and customers against 
dealing with a potential competitor, violated section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.151 The Seventh Circuit’s rationale was that the liability of a parent 
and its wholly owned subsidiary was appropriate “when there is enough 
separation between the two entities to make treating them as two 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Jewish Hosp. Ass’n v. Stewart Mech. Enters., Inc., 628 F.2d 971, 975 (6th Cir. 
1980). 
 145. See Duffy, supra note 117, at 1743. 
 146. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 n.16 (1977). 
 147. See Ann I. Jones, Comment, Intraenterprise Antitrust Conspiracy: A Decision-
making Approach, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1732, 1732-34 (1983). 
 148. See generally id. 
 149. Id. at 1733. 
 150. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
 151. Id. at 755-58. 
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independent actors sensible.”152 However, the Supreme Court reversed 
this decision, limiting the inquiry to the narrow issue of whether a parent 
and its wholly owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring in violation 
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.153 In doing so, the Supreme Court 
established a different way of viewing when a parent and its wholly 
owned subsidiary would be considered a single entity.154 According to 
the Supreme Court, the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine provided 
that section 1 liability is not foreclosed merely because a parent and its 
subsidiary are subject to common ownership.155 Thus, Copperweld held 
that, for the purpose of section 1 of the Sherman Act, a parent 
corporation is incapable of conspiring with its wholly owned 
subsidiaries.156 
Underlying Copperweld’s rejection of the intra-enterprise 
conspiracy doctrine was the Court’s assumption that the Sherman Act 
treats unilateral actions under section 2 of the Sherman Act less harshly 
than concerted action under section 1. 157  This is because certain 
agreements, such as horizontal price-fixing, are thought so inherently 
anticompetitive that they are per se illegal without inquiry into the harm 
they actually cause.158 Conversely, vertical price-fixing agreements hold 
the promise of increasing a firm’s efficiency and enabling it to compete 
more efficiently.159 Therefore, these combinations are judged under a 
“rule of reason” analysis. 160  This “rule of reason” gives “the courts 
adequate latitude to examine the substance rather than the form of an 
arrangement.”161 In other words, the corporate interrelationships of the 
conspirators are not indicative of the applicability of the Sherman Act.162 
                                                                                                                 
 152. Id. at 759 (citation omitted). 
 153. Id. at 767. 
 154. See id. 
 155. Id. at 759. 
 156. Id. at 777. 
 157. Id. at 767-68. 
 158. Id. at 768 (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. (citing Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); Chi. 
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-40 (1918)). 
 161. Id. at 778 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 162. Id. at 760 (majority opinion) (citing Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 
288 U.S. 344, 360-61, 376-77 (1933)). 
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In Copperweld, the Court cited several economic reasons to treat a 
parent and subsidiary as one entity. Corporations delegate 
responsibilities to autonomous units to minimize costs and provide 
efficiencies from decentralization.163 Indeed, creating a rule that would 
punish corporations from this decentralization would serve no useful 
antitrust purpose.164 Furthermore, the coordinated activity of a parent 
and its subsidiaries must be treated as a single unit for the purposes of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act.165 This is because a parent and its wholly 
owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest: common objectives, 
one corporate consciousness, and the same course of action.166 Because 
of these similarities, there is no sudden joining of corporate resources, 
and therefore no justification of section 1 scrutiny. 167  A section 1 
“agreement” may be found when “the conspirators had a unity of 
purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds 
in an unlawful arrangement.”168 Because a parent and wholly owned 
subsidiary always have a “unity of purpose,” the term “agreement” 
within section 1 of the Sherman Act lacks meaning.169 If this unity starts 
to waiver and the subsidiary fails to act in the parent’s best interest, the 
parent may assert full control over the subsidiary and “rein” in their 
actions.170   
In making its decision to overrule the intra-enterprise conspiracy 
doctrine in Copperweld, the Supreme Court looked at substance rather 
than form. The doctrine looked at the form of the enterprise’s structure, 
and thus “ignore[d] the reality.”171 Antitrust liability, the Court held, 
                                                                                                                 
 163. See id. at 771. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. (citing Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946)). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 771-72. Some courts apply a “single entity” test, that sets forth various 
criteria for evaluating whether a given parent and subsidiary are capable of conspiring 
with one another. However, when a subsidiary is wholly owned, the factors in the test 
are insufficient to describe a separate economic entity for purposes of the Sherman Act. 
Therefore, the parent and subsidiary must be viewed as a single economic unit. Id. at 
772 n.18 (citing Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 588-89 (8th Cir. 1981); Las 
Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1979); Photovest 
Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 727 (7th Cir. 1979)). 
 171. Id. at 772. 
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should not depend on how a corporate subunit is structured. 172  The 
economic or legal considerations that lead a corporate management to 
choose one structure over the other bears no relevance to whether the 
conduct threatens competition.173 A corporation has complete power to 
maintain a wholly owned subsidiary regardless of the form and may 
adopt a form for valid management purposes.174 “If antitrust liability 
turned on the garb in which a corporate subunit was clothed, parent 
corporations would be encouraged to convert subsidiaries into 
unincorporated divisions.”175 This would serve no valid antitrust goals, 
and would merely deprive consumers and producers of the benefits that 
the subsidiary form may yield.176 
B. THE PARENT-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FTAIA 
1. Motorola Mobility Background 
Motorola Mobility involved an American parent company whose 
foreign subsidiaries were part of a global supply chain involved in the 
production of mobile phones. 177  The defendants in the litigation 
allegedly participated in anticompetitive conduct by fixing the prices of 
LCD panels, a necessary component of the phones.178 Motorola filed suit 
for damages in Illinois, and the action was consolidated with other cases 
in a California multi-district litigation (“MDL”).179 The California MDL 
court divided the purchase of the LCD panels into three categories: (1) 
purchases of LCD panels by Motorola that were delivered directly to 
Motorola facilities in the United States (“Category 1,” about 1% of 
purchases); (2) purchases of LCD panels by Motorola’s foreign affiliates 
                                                                                                                 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. (citing Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 
(1951)). 
 176. Id. at 771. 
 177. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d 
816, 817 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 178. Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 09 C 6610, 2014 WL 
258154, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2014). Unlike some inputs, LCD panels have no utility 
apart from their component value. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 4. 
 179. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 11. 
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that were delivered to the foreign affiliates’ manufacturing facilities 
abroad, where they were incorporated into mobile phones that were later 
sold to the United States (“Category 2”); and (3) purchases of LCD 
panels by Motorola’s foreign affiliates that were delivered to the foreign 
affiliates’ manufacturing facilities abroad and were later incorporated 
into mobile phones sold outside the United States (“Category 3”).180 
It was not disputed that the Category 1 purchases were subject to 
the Sherman Act.181 The issue was whether the price-fixing of either 
Category 2 or Category 3 panels were actionable under the Sherman 
Act.182 The defendants argued that Motorola could not recover under 
United States law for any panels that were initially delivered abroad 
because these deliveries created only “foreign injury” not subject to 
United States antitrust law.183 Conversely, Motorola argued that they 
were domestically injured by defendant’s conduct through the increased 
price Motorola was paying to manufacture and import its LCD products 
for sale in the United States.184 
The California MDL court initially sided with the defendants, 
holding that the defendants’ conduct could not involve imports because 
it was Motorola, not the defendants, who imported the price-fixed 
panels.185 However, Motorola was granted leave to amend and file a 
second amended complaint to add new allegations concerning the 
defendants’ conduct in the United States, how Motorola was specifically 
targeted, the extent of Motorola’s control over its subsidiaries, and “the 
method by which global prices were negotiated and set by Motorola’s 
procurement team in Illinois and the connection to Motorola’s foreign 
injury.” 186  The defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended 
complaint was denied, 187  as was their motion for partial summary 
judgment, 188  and the case was remanded to the Northern District of 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Id. 
 181. Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 817. 
 182. Id. at 817-18. 
 183. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 11. 
 184. Id. at 12. 
 185. Id. at 12-13. 
 186. In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 785 F. Supp. 2d 835, 837, 844 
(N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 187. Id. at 847. 
 188. In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. C 09-5840 SI, 2012 WL 
3276932, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012). 
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Illinois. 189  On remand, the court granted the defendants’ motion for 
reconsideration of the MDL court’s ruling and dismissed Motorola’s 
claims based on overseas purchases by its foreign subsidiaries.190 The 
court reasoned that even if there was a sufficient domestic effect, there 
was not a “substantial” effect on American domestic or import 
commerce, as required by the FTAIA.191 
Without receiving any briefing, and without oral argument, the 
Seventh Circuit issued a brief, unanimous opinion affirming the lower 
court.192 First, the court held that there was no direct effect on United 
States commerce.193 The court reasoned that the “effect of component 
price-fixing on the price of the product of which it is a component is 
indirect.”194 Second, the court held that the effect on domestic commerce 
did not give rise to Motorola’s antitrust claim. 195  Finally, the court 
concluded by noting the prevalence of global supply chains in the 
current economy and predicted that to extend application of the Sherman 
Act to the activities of the defendants in this case would result in an 
“enormous[] increase [in] the global reach of the Sherman Act, creating 
friction with many foreign countries.”196 However, if the Seventh Circuit 
considered Motorola’s American parent company and foreign 
subsidiaries as one unit, then the effect of the price-fixed LCD panels 
would be direct, rather than indirect, and would give rise to Motorola’s 
antitrust claim.197 
Motorola petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing that the panel’s 
decision conflicted with Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc. 198  and F. 
                                                                                                                 
 189. Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 09 C 6610, 2014 WL 
258154, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2014). 
 190. Id. at *10. 
 191. Id. at *9-10. 
 192. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola I), 746 F.3d 842 
(7th Cir.), vacated & reh’g granted, 775 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 193. Id. at 844. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 845. 
 196. Id. at 846. 
 197. See generally Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 723 (1977). 
 198. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The 
Seventh Circuit held in Minn-Chem that the FTAIA “reaffirm[s] the well-established 
principle that the U.S. antitrust laws reach foreign conduct that harms U.S. commerce.” 
Id. at 858. 
2016]   A SINGLE CALL 665 
Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,199 and would weaken antitrust 
enforcement by the government.200 In Minn-Chem, the court recognized 
that the “direct effect” requirement of the FTAIA simply addresses 
whether the domestic effect is too remote from the ultimate effects on 
United States commerce. 201  Furthermore, the Supreme Court in 
Empagran held that the “gives rise to” requirement of the FTAIA 
precludes cases where the plaintiff’s claims rests solely on independent 
foreign harm.202 Thus, the FTAIA only “remove[s] from the Sherman 
Act’s reach . . . commercial activities taking place abroad, unless those 
activities adversely affect domestic commerce [or] import 
commerce,”203 as Motorola argued was the case here. 
Motorola asserted that the fact that the panels were purchased and 
delivered abroad was not dispositive.204 Motorola claimed that the price-
fixing activity abroad raised the prices of mobile cell phones in the 
United States, thereby directly causing a domestic effect and satisfying 
the “direct effect” requirement of the FTAIA.205 Furthermore, Motorola 
argued that it satisfied the proximate cause standard of the “gives rise 
to” requirement of the FTAIA because the foreign and domestic prices 
“arise from the same, plaintiff-specific negotiations and acts of 
conspiratorial price-fixing.”206 
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion, after rehearing, followed the same 
general line of reasoning as its vacated opinion.207 The court assumed 
that Motorola met the “direct effect” prong of the FTAIA, but failed 
                                                                                                                 
 199. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004). The 
court concluded that a purchaser in the United States could bring a Sherman Act claim 
under the FTAIA based on domestic injury, but a purchaser in Ecuador could not bring 
a Sherman Act claim based on foreign harm. Id. 
 200. See Craig C. Corbitt & Aaron M. Sheanin, Appellate Courts Grapple with the 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act—Plaintiffs’ Perspective, COMPETITION, Fall 
2014, at 9. 
 201. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 858. 
 202. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159. 
 203. Id. at 161. 
 204. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 10-12, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics 
Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-8003), 2014 WL 
5510635, at *10-12. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 17-18. 
 207. Compare Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 817-18, with Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU 
Optronics Corp. (Motorola I), 746 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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under the “gives rise to” prong.208 The court stated that the effect of 
fixing the price of a component on the price of the final product was less 
direct than the conduct in Minn-Chem where “foreign sellers allegedly 
created a cartel, took steps outside the United States to drive the price up 
of a product wanted in the United States, and then . . . sold that product 
to U.S. Customers.”209 However, the court also found that the facts of 
Motorola Mobility did not rise to the level of those in Minn-Chem, 
which definitely precluded liability under the Sherman Act: the 
“situation in which action in the foreign country filters through the 
layers and finally causes a few ripples in the United States.”210 As a 
result, the court provided no guidance for determining when an effect is 
direct, and instead simply assumed that Motorola had satisfied the 
“direct effect” requirement.211 Additionally, rather than discuss in detail 
whether the “gives rise to” prong of the FTAIA was satisfied, the bulk 
of the opinion was dedicated to the Illinois Brick doctrine.212 
The Seventh Circuit concluded that Motorola could not recover 
from the foreign cartel members because it was an indirect purchaser of 
the LCD panels and did not meet the requirements of the FTAIA.213 
Additionally, the court held that the parent company and its foreign 
subsidiaries were two separate entities, so that the FTAIA can prevent 
“unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other 
nations.” 214  Lastly, the court held that if Motorola and its foreign 
subsidiaries were to be seen as a single entity, it would have been 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 818-20. 
 209. Id. at 819 (quoting Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 860 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (en banc)). 
 210. Id. (quoting Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 860) (explaining that this case “doesn’t 
seem like ‘many layers’ resulting in just ‘a few ripples’ in the United States cellphone 
market.”). 
 211. Id. (“We’ll assume that the requirement of a direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect on domestic commerce has been satisfied.”). 
 212. Id. at 819-27. Illinois Brick did not deal with price-fixing as applied to a global 
supply chain, and there is dicta in that case that might indicate it should not be applied 
to Motorola’s situation. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 213. Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 824. 
 214. Id. (quoting F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 
(2004)). The Seventh Circuit assumed the cartel met the substantive requirements of the 
FTAIA, but that Motorola did not meet the second FTAIA requirement that the conduct 
“gives rise to” Motorola’s claim. Id. 
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injured abroad when it purchased the price-fixed components. 215 
However, the court failed to explain how the purchase of the price-fixed 
components and subsequent import of cell phones into the United States 
did not involve import trade or commerce, merely stating “[i]t was 
Motorola, rather than the defendants, that imported these [LCD] panels 
into the United States.”216 
2. The Parent-Subsidiary Relationship in Motorola Mobility 
One of Motorola’s several claims was that it functioned with its 
subsidiaries as a single enterprise.217 “That is true both as a technical 
matter—because Motorola . . . imported its LCD products for sale at a 
higher cost—and as a matter of substance, because the corporate 
distinction between Motorola and its subsidiaries ha[d] no antitrust-
economics relevance in either the LCD-panel or mobile-phone 
market.”218 The defendants’ anti-competitive conduct directly affected 
Motorola in its capacity as an American parent company, not only 
because Motorola controlled the purchases of its subsidiaries and 
absorbed the higher manufacturing costs, but also because Motorola was 
forced to pay taxes in the United States on its “repatriated” profits.219 
The defendants argued that Motorola and its subsidiaries were not a 
single entity, but rather separate corporations that Motorola created in 
order to take advantage of foreign labor markets and foreign regulatory 
                                                                                                                 
 215. Id. at 823. 
 216. Id. at 818. But cf. United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 756 (9th Cir. 
2014) (stating that the argument that AU Optronics is not an “importer” misses the 
point; the panels were sold into the United States, falling squarely within the scope of 
the Sherman Act); Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 
470 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that “[f]unctioning as a physical importer may satisfy the 
import trade or commerce exception, but it is not a necessary prerequisite,” and that the 
exclusion could be satisfied because “defendants’ conduct target[ed] import goods or 
services”). The Third Circuit further held that the “import [exclusion] is not limited to 
importers, but also applies if defendants’ conduct is directed at an import market.” 
Animal Sci. Prods, 654 F.3d at 471 n.11. In Motorola Mobility, it could be argued that 
defendants targeted the U.S. market. However, a full discussion of Motorola’s target 
theory is outside the scope of this Note. 
 217. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 46. 
 218. Id. at 9 (citation omitted). 
 219. Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief, supra note 51, at 6. 
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environments.220 Their rationale was that any such increased costs were 
incurred at the time of the foreign purchase of the LCD panels and that 
Motorola did not pay any overcharges again when the phones with LCD 
components were shipped to the United States. 221  However, the 
defendants knew that all aspects of Motorola’s mobile phone business 
began and ended with the American parent company.222 Further, they 
admitted that “Motorola [stood] in the shoes of its subsidiaries for 
purposes of asserting their claims.” 223  The defendants’ constant 
emphasis on the separate existence of Motorola and its subsidiaries 
“obscured the substantive reality of an integrated, company-wide 
process for designing, building, importing, and selling Motorola 
phones.”224 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit held that Motorola did not 
have standing under the FTAIA. 225  The court instead held that 
Motorola’s American parent corporation and its foreign subsidiaries 
were not a single integrated enterprise.226 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Motorola Mobility precludes any 
injured purchasers from recovering damages under the Sherman Act 
from a cartel that had significantly harmed the United States 
economy.227 Direct purchasers are barred by the FTAIA, and indirect 
purchasers (including United States consumers) are barred by Illinois 
Brick, even where foreign conduct causes a severe domestic effect and a 
mild foreign effect.228 As a result, Motorola suffered all of the injury 
                                                                                                                 
 220. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 34, Motorola II, 775 F.3d 816 (No. 14-8003), 
2014 WL 5510636, at *34. Defendants further argue that Motorola cannot ignore their 
separate existence simply because it prefers U.S. antitrust remedies to foreign remedies. 
Id. 
 221. Id. at 35. 
 222. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 7. 
 223. Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 220, at 4 (citing Coplay Cement Co. 
v. Willis & Paul Grp., 983 F.2d 1435, 1442 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
 224. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 9. 
 225. Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 827. 
 226. Id. at 820. The court’s rationale for this is that “American law does not collapse 
parents and subsidiaries (or sister corporations) in that way.” Id. While this may be true 
legally, it is not true economically. See infra Part II.C. 
 227. Brief for the United States & the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Neither Party at 6, Motorola II, 775 F.3d 816 (No. 14-8003), 2014 WL 
4678234, at *6 [hereinafter Brief for the United States]. 
 228. See generally Motorola II, 775 F.3d 816. 
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associated with the defendants’ anticompetitive behavior in its capacity 
as an American parent company.229 
a. The Seventh Circuit’s Misunderstanding of the FTAIA 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision to treat Motorola as a distinct entity 
from its subsidiaries further impacted Motorola’s antitrust standing 
under the FTAIA. This was in part due to a misunderstanding of the 
“direct effect” prong of the FTAIA. The circuits are split on how they 
interpret the definition of “direct” within the “direct effect” prong as 
well as the meaning of the “gives rise to” prong.230 
The Seventh Circuit, similar to the Second Circuit, has interpreted 
“direct” to mean “reasonably proximate causal nexus.”231 In contrast, the 
Ninth Circuit defines direct to mean “immediate consequence” or 
“characterized by or giving evidence of a close especially logical, 
causal, or consequential relationship.” 232  The issue with the Seventh 
Circuit’s definition is that it does not satisfy the goal of deterrence.233 
The text of the FTAIA couples “direct” with “reasonably foreseeable” 
and “substantial.”234 That an effect must be “reasonably foreseeable” is 
to require that it is reasonable to expect a company to be aware what 
conduct would cause further harm.235  A foreign company cannot be 
deterred from harming United States commerce if it does not realize that 
its actions would have such an effect.236 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s 
definition of “direct” serves the objective of deterrence because if 
                                                                                                                 
 229. Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief, supra note 51, at 6. However, Motorola could 
have sued abroad, where the injury took place. Motorola II, 775 F.3d at 823. 
 230. Compare Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 398 (2d 
Cir. 2014), and Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc), with United States v. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672, 674, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 231. See Lotes Co., 683 F.3d at 857; Minn-Chem, Inc., 683 F.3d at 857; see also 
Makan Delrahim, Drawing the Boundaries of the Sherman Act: Recent Developments 
in the Application of the Antitrust Laws to Foreign Conduct, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 415, 430 (2005). 
 232. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d at 698. 
 233. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2nd. Cir. 1945) 
(“We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, 
for conduct which has no consequences within the United States.”). 
 234. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2012). 
 235. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d at 680. 
 236. See Joseph E. Harrington, Motorola Mobility and the FTAIA: A Deterrence-
Based Definition of “Direct” Effect, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Sept. 2014, at 4. 
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foreign companies anticipate that they will be held liable when their 
conduct caused harm, then they will be less inclined to pursue the 
conduct that causes the harm.237 
As for the “gives rise to” prong, in Empagran, the Supreme Court 
explained that it is supposed to do no more than incorporate an antitrust 
injury inquiry into the FTAIA. 238  The question in Empagran was 
whether an anticompetitive price-fixing activity, that was in significant 
part foreign, caused some domestic antitrust injury, and independently 
caused separate foreign injury, gave rise to a Sherman Act claim.239 The 
Court held that a domestic purchaser could bring a claim under the 
Sherman Act and FTAIA, but a foreign purchaser could not bring a 
claim based solely on foreign harm. 240  The Court characterized 
“independent foreign harm” as foreign harm caused by a foreign 
anticompetitive effect that is independent of any domestic 
anticompetitive effect.241 
In light of this characterization, the Seventh Circuit’s application of 
the “gives rise to” requirement misreads Empagran. 242  The Supreme 
Court in Empagran found that when plaintiffs claim independent foreign 
harm, the FTAIA should be read to require: (1) “a domestic effect give 
rise to ‘a claim’ for antitrust injury;” and (2) “a domestic effect give rise 
to the plaintiff’s own claim at issue.”243 In other words, the plaintiff 
must have antitrust standing to assert, and, in fact must assert, the 
antitrust injury it proffers as having arisen from a domestic effect.244 
Although Motorola did not claim independent foreign harm, “the fact 
that a domestic effect did not give rise to Motorola’s own claim or the 
claim at issue should not have prevented Motorola from asserting that a 
domestic effect gave rise to ‘a claim.’”245 As a result, Motorola should 
have been able to satisfy the “gives rise to” prong of the FTAIA with 
                                                                                                                 
 237. See id. 
 238. See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 173-74 
(2004). 
 239. Id. at 155. 
 240. Id. at 159. 
 241. Id. at 156. 
 242. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. (Motorola II), 775 F.3d 816, 
824 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 243. Stutz, supra note 18, at 6. 
 244. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165; see also Stutz, supra note 18, at 6. 
 245. Stutz, supra note 18, at 7. 
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“any cognizable antitrust injury arising from a domestic effect” because 
it claimed that foreign harm proximately caused a United States 
domestic effect, not that there was independent foreign harm.246 
III. PROTECTING AMERICAN COMPANIES IN A GLOBAL SOCIETY: 
PERMITTING THE FIRST AFFECTED UNITED STATES PURCHASER TO 
SUE IN THE AFTERMATH OF MOTOROLA MOBILITY 
A. WRONGFULLY DISTINGUISHING MOTOROLA MOBILITY FROM 
COPPERWELD AND ILLINOIS BRICK 
The interpretation of Motorola Mobility is inconsistent with 
Copperweld and Illinois Brick. This section will discuss why the 
Seventh Circuit improperly applied the precedent from these prior 
antitrust cases. 
1. Copperweld 
The defendants in Motorola Mobility argued that the principle of 
Copperweld—that a single corporate conglomerate cannot conspire with 
itself in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act—had no bearing in 
the case because Motorola was not defending itself against a section 1 
conspiracy claim. 247  The defendants further argued that the injured 
parties, Motorola’s subsidiaries, were foreign corporations complaining 
about foreign injuries. 248  However, the focus on the corporate 
relationship between Motorola and its subsidiaries missed the issue at 
hand. 249  When it comes to protecting the American economy from 
international cartels, the inquiry should not be whether Motorola 
structured its own corporate relationships as “subsidiaries” or 
“unincorporated divisions.” 250  In fact, the Supreme Court stated in 
Copperweld that “[a]ntitrust liability should not depend on whether a 
corporate subunit is organized as an unincorporated division or a wholly 
owned subsidiary.”251 Furthermore, Copperweld condemned an antitrust 
rule that would treat subsidiaries and divisions differently where it 
                                                                                                                 
 246. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 247. Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 220, at 34-35. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 26. 
 250. Id. at 27. 
 251. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 772 (1984). 
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“serves no valid antitrust goals [and] merely deprives consumers and 
producers of the benefits [of] the subsidiary form.”252 The Court was 
concerned about the potential of such a rule to turn antitrust inquiries 
into decisions made on the basis of corporate structure.253 The Court 
made clear that, when it comes to antitrust law, the consequences of 
corporate-organizational decisions should be determined based on 
questions of antitrust policy and economics.254 
In breaking with the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, the Court 
in Copperweld noted that its economic entity approach was consistent 
with other areas of potential section 1 liability. 255  The Court 
acknowledged that a corporation and its officers are separate actors, and 
that a corporation and its divisions are formally separate. 256 
Nevertheless, the Court did not hold a corporation and its officers or 
divisions as “conspirators” when they carry out their business. 257 
Instead, the Court treated them as a single economic entity, subject to 
less rigorous scrutiny, thereby ensuring that the Sherman Act does not 
dampen their “competitive zeal.”258 Although Motorola Mobility does 
not involve a parent-subsidiary relationship among conspirators, but 
rather victims, the rationale in Copperweld should equally apply. The 
only consideration that should have mattered in the outcome of 
Motorola Mobility, regardless of the form in which Motorola chose to 
organize its corporation, was that Motorola’s claims related directly to 
conduct that deliberately harmed the United States.259 Thus, Motorola 
and its subsidiaries should have been seen as one entity. If that were the 
case, the direct effect of the price-fixed LCD panels on the United States 
market should have been sufficient for Motorola to bring its claim.260 
                                                                                                                 
 252. Id. at 774. 
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 254. Id. at 777. 
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 256. Id. at 770-71 (1984). 
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 259. Appellants Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 13. 
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2. Illinois Brick 
The fact that Motorola and its subsidiaries functioned as a single 
economic unit means that the indirect purchaser doctrine likewise 
cannot be sensibly applied. 261  In Motorola Mobility, Motorola’s 
subsidiaries were wholly owned. 262  Given the nature of the wholly 
owned subsidiary, it has been suggested that “courts should invoke the 
[“own or control”] exception only to ensure that sellers do not insulate 
themselves from suit . . . by strong-arming direct purchasers into 
choosing not to sue.”263 In this instance, the direct purchasers do not 
have standing to sue because they are located in a foreign country, and 
thus cannot complain about effects on United States commerce because 
they are “upstream” from any effects that follow from importing the 
finished product. 264  However, Motorola cannot raise its own claim 
because it is “downstream” from the direct-purchaser subsidiaries, and 
so, it is barred by Illinois Brick.265 This means that no one can recover 
damages for the defendants’ conduct, despite its substantial harm on 
United States commerce.266 
If Motorola and its foreign subsidiaries were properly seen as a 
single entity, then the Illinois Brick doctrine would not apply.267 The 
Court in Illinois Brick recognized that exceptions to the Hanover Shoe 
                                                                                                                 
 261. See, e.g., Jewish Hosp. Ass’n v. Stewart Mech. Enters., Inc., 628 F.2d 971, 975 
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rule268 have been urged for in other situations in which most of the 
overcharge is purportedly passed on—for example, “where a price-fixed 
good is a small but vital input into a much larger product, making the 
demand for the price-fixed good highly inelastic.”269 However, the Court 
in Illinois Brick rejected these exceptions.270 
The significance of these two cases therefore depends on whether 
Motorola and its subsidiaries were seen as a single unit.271 In Hanover 
Shoe, the court did not endorse the “passing-on” defense against 
middlemen who did not alter the goods they purchased before reselling 
them.272 If Motorola’s subsidiaries were seen as a separate entity from 
the parent company, they would fall under this “middlemen” category.273 
However, if Motorola and its subsidiaries were seen as one entity, then, 
similar to Illinois Brick, the “passing-on” defense would be unavailable 
to the defendants because Motorola itself bought the LCD panels and 
converted them into cell phones. 274  Therefore, under Hanover Shoe, 
Motorola would be able to recover damages.275 
The defendants in Motorola Mobility rejected the notion that 
Motorola and its subsidiaries were a single entity and argued that neither 
Motorola nor its subsidiaries have a claim because Motorola was barred 
by downstream recovery.276 However, if the “own or control” exception 
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applies, 277  and Illinois Brick’s bar on pass-through claims does not, 
Motorola has antitrust standing and injury because it complains about a 
“prototypical” antitrust harm, collusive price-fixing, that passed through 
to it.278 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that injured parties in 
downstream markets do have relevant injuries and antitrust standing 
under the FTAIA.279 Therefore, Motorola has a viable claim for the harm 
it suffered as a purchaser of the tainted cell phones in import commerce, 
and has standing to sue under the FTAIA. 
B. THE EFFECT OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN MOTOROLA 
MOBILITY 
The primary focus of the United States antitrust laws is to deter 
behaviors that harm United States commerce.280 The Seventh Circuit’s 
decision fails to consider the adverse effects it would have on two 
economic policy goals: deterrence of cartels and promotion of the 
efficient use of international supply chains relied upon by American 
companies and consumers. 281  The facts of Motorola Mobility are 
increasingly common in today’s interconnected global economy.282 It is 
not unusual that an American company, which owns and controls 
foreign subsidiaries as part of its supply chain, finds itself victimized by 
a global cartel.283 In the last twenty-five years, international price-fixing 
conspiracies have cost consumers around the globe more than $1 
trillion.284 The particular price-fixing conspiracy in Motorola Mobility 
affected well over $23.5 billion in sales of LCD panels imported into the 
United States and enabled conspirators to impose overcharges of more 
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than $2 billion on those imports.285 Consequently, both effective cartel 
deterrence and the efficient use of international supply chains are policy 
goals of exceptional public importance that have been hindered by the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision.286 
A number of prominent economists and academic organizations 
submitted an amicus brief on behalf of Motorola.287 They argued that as 
a matter of economic policy, purchases by foreign affiliates of American 
companies “should be permitted to seek treble damages in U.S. courts to 
deter the formation of cartels that harm U.S. consumers and 
businesses.”288 The American Antitrust Institute (“AAI”) echoed these 
policy concerns, arguing that the Seventh Circuit panel’s decision 
undermines deterrence of foreign cartels that harm American businesses 
and consumers.289 The AAI further criticized the panel’s decision “for 
adopting a ‘super Illinois Brick rule’ that would preclude indirect 
purchasers in the United States from recovery for injury caused by 
foreign cartels.” 290  In this manner, they argued, the panel was 
determined to combat an “explosion of litigation against international 
cartels,” based on its belief that American consumers were harmed so 
often that to permit recovery would open the floodgates.291 
Congress designed the FTAIA to strike a balance between 
protecting commerce and consumers while “avoiding unreasonable 
interference with the regulation of foreign markets by other countries” in 
respect of comity. 292  In the FTAIA context, comity is “‘prescriptive 
comity’: the respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the 
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reach of their laws.”293 While there is a strong presumption that federal 
statutes are to be construed to avoid interference with the sovereign 
interests of other nations, the increasingly global economic and multi-
layered supply chains have made the protection of United States 
commerce that much more important.294 There is no reason to believe 
that Congress would have intended the FTAIA to depart from long-
settled precedent that applies the Sherman Act to cartels that harm the 
United States, but to instead largely immunize foreign cartels from 
liability for the damage they cause American companies and 
consumers.295 
Furthermore, antitrust penalties imposed on international cartels 
“are collectively inadequate to deter international cartels, in part because 
many nations do not even have laws against international price-fixing 
cartels.” 296  The Seventh Circuit’s ruling creates an incentive to 
inefficiently reorganize a supply chain to change the purchaser to the 
American parent company and the delivery location to the Untied States 
for legal reasons. 297  This would result in the loss of benefits a 
corporation would otherwise stand to gain from locating near key 
foreign suppliers. 298  It would likewise force American companies to 
forgo potential benefits from moving production offshore.299 Consider 
this: it would be efficient for Motorola to purchase LCD panels 
delivered in the United States, but not for LCD panels delivered abroad 
to Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries. Therefore, in response to the legal 
rule crafted by Seventh Circuit barring an antitrust claim based on LCD 
panels delivered abroad, “Motorola would be incentivized to switch its 
purchasing behavior to have its parent company, and not its foreign 
subsidiaries, make future purchases and take delivery in the United 
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States.”300 The outcome from the Seventh Circuit’s decision thus creates 
economic inefficiencies that leave American consumers worse off. 
Moreover, there is a chance that the Seventh Circuit’s ruling has the 
unintended consequence of encouraging the creation of cartels by 
foreign countries to attract business. 301  The rule would allow such 
countries to permit the exploitation of American parent companies’ 
supply chains by selling to foreign subsidiaries barred from pursuing an 
antitrust claim in United States courts, as was the case in Motorola 
Mobility.302 The result would lead to increased production costs and, 
ultimately, higher prices of final United States consumer goods.303 
Regardless of where the LCD panels were purchased or delivered, 
this price-fixing conduct resulted in the elevation of the price of LCD 
panels, which in turn elevated the price of the finished cellphones by the 
exact same amount. 304  This is where the example provided in the 
beginning of this Note rears its head.305 It does not matter whether an 
LCD panel was sent to the United States and then manufactured into a 
Motorola phone, manufactured into a Motorola phone in Asia and then 
sent to the United States, or manufactured into a Motorola phone in Asia 
and sold into the United States, because the substance of these 
transactions is all the same.306 Rather, the only thing that should matter 
is the substance of the actions: a price-fixed commodity was placed in a 
product and shipped to the United States, effectively harming American 
consumers.307 
C. RESOLUTION: PERMITTING THE FIRST AFFECTED PURCHASER TO SUE 
Courts should recognize an exception to the FTAIA in cases where 
an antitrust violation makes its way through a wholly owned foreign 
subsidiary into United States commerce. There is nothing within the 
language of the FTAIA to prevent such an exception.308  Rather, the 
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FTAIA sets a “general rule placing all (nonimport) activity involving 
foreign commerce outside” the reach of the antitrust laws, and then 
makes exceptions for when “the conduct both (1) sufficiently affects 
American commerce . . . and (2) has an effect of a kind that antitrust law 
considers harmful.”309 Therefore, courts could abide by the FTAIA by 
recognizing an exception that allows the first affected American 
purchaser standing to sue when the antitrust activity originally occurs 
abroad, but ultimately affects United States commerce provided that the 
direct purchaser is a wholly owned entity of the first affected purchaser. 
Given that $2 billion in overcharges on the import of LCD panels 
resulted in Motorola Mobility, 310  an exception to the Illinois Brick 
doctrine is warranted when a wholly owned foreign subsidiary of an 
American parent corporation is the direct purchaser of a price-fixed 
commodity. Several courts have observed that the bar to indirect 
purchaser damages claims does not “apply when no purchaser could 
obtain damages, for then there is no risk of double recovery (and no 
need to calculate elasticities in order to apportion damages among 
multiple tiers).”311 A new exception would permit damages claims by 
the first purchaser affected in United States commerce when section 
6(a)(2) of the FTAIA bars the direct purchasers’ claims. 312  This 
construction would also permit enforcement of the antitrust laws without 
implicating Illinois Brick’s concerns regarding multiple recoveries.313 If 
courts do not recognize this exception, Motorola Mobility may have the 
effect of excluding any private plaintiff from recovering damages under 
the federal antitrust laws.314 
This new exception would help resolve the standing issue presented 
in Motorola Mobility. 315  Under Motorola Mobility, Motorola’s 
subsidiaries could not sue pursuant to the Sherman Act because their 
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injuries occurred abroad.316 In turn, Motorola could not sue because it 
did not make direct purchases from the cartel. 317  This interpretation 
creates somewhat of a paradox where no private party can sue for the 
antitrust violations in the United States, allowing the cartel to get away 
with its antitrust violations.318 Although the application of the Sherman 
Act should avoid “creating friction with many foreign countries,”319 
United States antitrust law needs to take an interest in protecting 
American parent companies like Motorola from antitrust violations 
abroad. 
While Motorola’s American parent company should have fallen 
under the “own or control” exception to Illinois Brick, the court rejected 
this theory because the subsidiaries were incorporated under foreign 
law.320 Given that the sole reason Motorola was prevented from claiming 
the “own or control” exception is due to the location of its subsidiary, 
the recognition of an exception under the FTAIA would help to resolve 
this dilemma.321 If Motorola’s subsidiaries did not have a claim because 
their injuries occurred abroad, Motorola should then have its own claim 
as an American corporation that actually imported the goods tainted by 
price-fixing into the United States for sale.322 This claim is justified in 
both form and substance because Motorola’s parent corporation acted 
alone in purchasing the phones while functioning with its subsidiaries as 
a single entity. 323  The key point is that Motorola is both the first 
purchaser in the United States and is the parent of its corporate family, 
and is therefore the ideal party to sue to correct the antitrust injuries to 
that family.324 Thus, an administrable exception to the indirect purchaser 
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doctrine, under the FTAIA, could be recognized to permit the first 
affected purchaser in United States commerce to seek damages. 
As with any doctrine, there is always a concern for over broadening 
the indirect purchaser doctrine to a point where the exceptions swallow 
the rule. However, this new exception would be narrowly limited to 
granting only the first affected American purchaser standing to sue when 
the antitrust activity originally occurs abroad, but ultimately affects 
United States commerce provided that the direct purchaser is a wholly 
owned entity of the first affected purchaser. Under this framework, the 
exception would limit the doctrine’s expansion while simultaneously 
allowing the indirect purchaser doctrine to evolve with the modern 
globalized society. Moreover, the recognition of this exception would 
uphold the broad purposes of Illinois Brick: avoiding duplicative 
liability while promoting deterrence and compensating antitrust 
victims.325 
CONCLUSION 
Given the increasing commonality of international supply chains, 
the current FTAIA does not adequately protect the welfare of American 
consumers. The current penalties in place by the FTAIA are insufficient 
to deter foreign cartels, leading to substantial harms within the United 
States market. For these economic reasons, American parent 
corporations should be able to seek damages pursuant to the antitrust 
laws for violations that occur abroad between wholly owned foreign 
subsidiaries and international cartels. Given that parents and subsidiaries 
are seen as a single economic entity in other antitrust contexts, 
maintaining this economic outlook, despite the legal corporate 
differences that may exist, would help resolve this apparent conflict. 
Furthermore, creating an exception to allow for an indirect parent 
corporation to sue on behalf of its direct wholly owned foreign 
subsidiary would not go against the purpose of Illinois Brick: given that 
it is the same umbrella corporation, there is no risk of duplicative 
recovery. This exception would not unduly broaden the reach of the 
Sherman Act, but rather allow American corporations to sue for antitrust 
violations when those actions directly affect United States commerce. 
The result would therefore protect the welfare of American consumers 
and maintain the original purpose of the Sherman Act by promoting 
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competition while combating international cartels and conspiracies that 
cause anticompetitive effects in the United States. 
 
